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ARMY PSYOP POG 1538-415A-95



4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS  
GROUP (AIRBORNE)

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**SPECIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STUDY**

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**The Counterdrug Commitment  
in Colombia: PSYOP-Relevant  
Tensions in the Antidrug Effort (U)**

POG-1538-415A-95  
May 1995

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## Special Psychological Operations Study

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# The Counterdrug Commitment in Colombia: PSYOP-Relevant Tensions in the Antidrug Effort (U)

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
## Executive Summary (U)

(U) Changing conditions in Colombia may affect the resolve of key groups and social sectors to persevere in the counterdrug (CD) effort. Furthermore, cooperation between Colombia and the United States on CD matters has proven vulnerable to new issues, attitudes, and sensitivities arising from the altered situation.

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1), Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) Understanding the attitudes of significant groups and social sectors in Colombian society is key to promoting a national consensus on prosecuting the drug war:



(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

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# The Counterdrug Commitment in Colombia: PSYOP- Relevant Tensions in the Antidrug Effort (U)

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## Introduction (U)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

## Background (U)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)



**Changing PSYOP-Relevant Conditions (U)**

(U) Despite the Gaviria government's demonstrated political will to engage at least the Medellin Cartel, a number of major events and changed conditions have arisen in 1993 and 1994 that have the potential to affect the resolve of key groups and social sectors in prosecuting the counterdrug effort:

- The death of Pablo Escobar and the decline of the Medellin Cartel,
- The consolidation by the Cali druglords of their ascendancy over other Colombian traffickers, and
- A change in Colombian government administrations.

**THE DEATH OF PABLO ESCOBAR AND THE DECLINE OF THE MEDELLIN CARTEL (U)**

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

**THE ASCENDANCY OF THE CALI CARTEL (U)**

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

**THE CHANGE IN COLOMBIAN ADMINISTRATIONS (U)**

(U) What effects the change in Colombian administrations will have on CD policies are still to be determined. President Samper's inconsistent backing for CD pro-

grams raises concerns for US-sponsored Colombian antidrug programs.

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

**Divisive Issues (U)**

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) In the months leading up to the 1994 election, however, Samper reversed his earlier prolegalization position and criticized the Colombian Constitutional Court's 1994 decision to legalize drugs for personal use. Samper noted that when he originally proposed legalization, only a few peasants were involved in marijuana growing and that over the last 15 years Colombian drug involvement had gone from marijuana to coca, from coca to cocaine, and from cocaine to narcoterrorism, making this type of legislation presently impossible.<sup>11</sup> During the controversy over the court's ruling, Samper supported the Gaviria administration's position and suggested either holding a referendum on the issue or passing a law to ban drug use.<sup>12</sup>

**HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION (U)**

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

**NEGOTIATED SURRENDERS AND THE SEVERITY OF PUNITIVE SANCTIONS (U)**

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

**THE LEGALIZATION ISSUE (U)**

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

**OFFICIAL SPECULATION ABOUT DRUG LEGALIZATION (U)**

(U) The theme of drug legalization has surfaced many times in Colombia, but recently it has added significantly

to the strained US-Colombian CD relationship. A fire storm erupted, both in Colombia and in the United States, when the press reported that De Greiff had called for drug legalization while participating in a 1994 conference at Harvard.<sup>24</sup> De Greiff contended that his opinions had been in an academic vein and had been blown out of proportion and that he had not proposed legalization as a means to stop the narcotics trade but to reduce the excessive profits made by traffickers.<sup>25</sup> Instead of being chastened by the ensuing controversy, he continued to insist on the need to study the possibility of legalization, particularly since the war on drug trafficking had been, in his opinion, a failure. De Greiff argued that even though the forces of order in Colombia had imprisoned and killed major drug traffickers, the illegal drug trade had not varied. Confiscation, he declared, continued at low levels, while drug cultivation and consumption of cocaine and heroin had increased and marijuana use had skyrocketed.<sup>26</sup> Such commentary by a publicly respected member of the Colombian government gave legitimacy to the legalization argument and touched sensitivities within the Gaviria administration and the US government. Many Colombians perceived that their country's international image had been damaged by the legalization debate, a perception that was accentuated when a Colombian court ruled in favor of depenalization of drug possession and use.

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

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(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

**SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES (U)**

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) Colombian press coverage of Juanchaco also focused on questions of sovereignty. In a creative vein, on the "Day of the Innocents" (which is similar to April Fools' Day), a tabloid carried a tongue-in-cheek front-page story on the arrival of the advance team, stating incorrectly that the troops were US Marines and that President Gaviria was going to give them the nation's equivalent to the Congressional Medal of Honor as well as the Department of Choco.<sup>47</sup> Other media reports decried "US interventionism," US embassy efforts to "orient the Colombian government's conduct," and a perceived US-orchestrated CD strategy involving "police and repressive actions . . . carried out on our soil, with our people, and exposing our lives."<sup>48</sup> Later press pieces noted suspiciously that Colombian authorities avoided questions about the violation of sovereignty and also expressed suspicions about the choice of an area close to Cali,<sup>49</sup> stating that "those of us who are neither slow nor stupid refuse to believe this excuse to cover some kind of wrongdoing. The presence of foreign troops puts us closer to the condition of a US colony or an occupied territory, just like Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."<sup>50</sup>

(U) **The Juanchaco "Fuertes Caminos" Exercise.** "Fuertes Caminos 94" (Strong Roads 94), a joint/combined civic-action military exercise held in January and February in southern Colombia, caused intergovernmental strain, placed the Gaviria administration on the defensive by forcing it to justify a perceived disregard for Colombian sovereignty, and brought press denunciations of inappropriate US activities. Tensions between the executive and legislative branches of the Colombian government arose even before a detachment from the US Army's 46th Engineer Battalion arrived in the town of Juanchaco. Some members of the Colombian Congress questioned this undertaking and, indeed, the presence of any US troops in their country. In these legislators' view, the decision to allow the exercise was a serious infraction of the new 1991 constitution<sup>44</sup> (which prohibits the transit of foreign troops in national territory without congressional permission).

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

US note (which was perceived as a personal attack on De Greiff) and the bad feeling generated by the Kerry hearings made De Greiff more popular than ever among Colombians, placing the Gaviria government on the defensive and forcing it into a public position critical of US actions.<sup>61</sup>

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) The Colombian foreign minister, Noemi Sanin, requested that the US government restore evidence-sharing partially suspended by the US government following the disagreement with De Greiff, stating that even though the Gaviria administration had "conceptual differences" with De Greiff, it could not allow him to be presented negatively at the international level. Sanin's response went on to criticize Senator Kerry for inviting a criminal to a congressional session to accuse the Colombian government, politicians, and media of narco-corruption.<sup>60</sup> The Colombian media praised the administration for its support of the Prosecutor General. The

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

**GOVERNMENT POLICYMAKERS (U)**

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(U) Although President Samper and other Colombian policy-makers have publicly acknowledged both the necessity to continue the war on drugs and their government's determination to persevere against the cartels, the question of whether the new administration will continue the same level of active CD involvement is still to be answered. It would be difficult for a Colombian admin-

istration, however, to withdraw support from established antidrug positions, especially given that most of the Colombian political spectrum is on record as supporting CD programs.

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

THE ARMED FORCES (U)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)



(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

THE MEDIA (U)

THE NATIONAL POLICE (U)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

THE GENERAL PUBLIC (U)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

**Conclusion** (U)


(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

## Endnotes <sup>(u)</sup>

(b)(1) Sec. 1.4(c)

(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403-1(i)(1), (b)(3):50 USC §403g

(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403-1(i)(1), (b)(3):50 USC §403g



30. (U) FBIS, Wirefile PA0705024494, 7 May 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA0705030794, 7 May 1994.
31. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 07085, 6 May 1994.
32. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 07892, 23 May 1994; FBIS, Wirefile PA2405030494, 24 May 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA2405155294, 24 May 1994.
33. (U) FBIS, Wirefile PA0206041894, 2 June 1994.
34. (U) FBIS, Wirefile PA0705024494, 7 May 1994.
35. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 07057 (U), 6 May 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA0605154794, 6 May 1994.
36. (U) FBIS, Wirefile PA0705020494, 7 May 1994.
37. (U) FBIS, Wirefile PA0605155094, 6 May 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA1205190294, 12 May 1994.
38. (U) FBIS, Wirefile PA1905224794, 19 May 1994; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 07804 (U), 20 May 1994; and DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 07824, 20 May 1994.
39. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 08367, 1 June 1994; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 08509 (U), 3 June 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA0306042694, 3 June 1994.
40. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 07639 (U), 18 May 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA1805042694, 18 May 1994.
41. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 08367, 1 June 1994; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 08509 (U), 3 June 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA0306042694, 3 June 1994.
42. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 07175 (U), 9 May 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA1005011394, 10 May 1994.
43. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 12981 (U), 2 September 1992; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 13685 (U), 15 September 1992; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 13752, 16 September 1992; FBIS, Wirefile PA1004043093, 10 April 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 06725, 30 April 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 15945, 18 October 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 15997, 19 October 1993; FBIS, Wirefile PA1910195793, 19 October 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 16117, 20 October 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 16152, 28 October 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 16209, 22 October 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 16994, 4 November 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 17597, 16 November 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 18762, 7 December 1993; FBIS, Wirefile PA1501235694, 15 January 1994; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 03771, 10 March 1994; "El Cowboy de la DEA," *El Tiempo*, 2 September 1994, 5(A); "DEA, Con Rabo de Paja," *El Tiempo*, 2 October 1994, 1(A), 24(A), and 25(A); and "Yo Acuso," *Semana*, 4-11 October 1994, 22-33.
44. (U) The 1991 constitution conferred greater authority on the legislative and judicial branches of the Colombian government. Executive decisions are now closely examined and, in some cases, disputed by other governmental authorities protective of their newly established powers.
45. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 19230, 17 December 1993; and DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 00948 (U), 21 January 1994.
46. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 19229, 17 December 1993.

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47. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 19652, 28 December 1993.
48. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 19230, 17 December 1993.
49. (U) Ibid.
50. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 19609, 27 December 1993.
51. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 06822 (U), 3 May 1994; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 06820, 3 May 1994; and DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 06837, 3 May 1994.
52. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 06553 (U), 28 April 1994; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 06588 (U), 28 April 1994; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 06684, 29 April 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA0105165194, 1 May 1994.
53. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 06685, 29 April 1994.
54. (U) Ibid.; and DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 06588 (U), 28 April 1994.
55. (U) FBIS, Wirefile PA0405045194, 4 May 1994.
56. (U) FBIS, Wirefile PA0205032394, 2 May 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA0405225094, 4 May 1994.
57. (U) FBIS, Wirefile PA2904233394, 29 April 1994.
58. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, 06933 Cable, 4 May 1994.
59. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 06589 (U), 28 April 1994; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 06822 (U), 3 May 1994; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 06820, 3 May 1994; and DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 06837, 3 May 1994.
60. (U) FBIS, Wirefile PA0405045194, 4 May 1994.
61. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 06663, 29 April 1994; FBIS, Wirefile PA2904185194, 29 April 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA0105165194, 1 May 1994.
62. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 04033 (U), 14 March 1994.
63. (U) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), ~~(S)~~Military Intelligence Digest (MID) 089-15A (U), 30 March 1994; and DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 04814 (U), 28 March 1994.
64. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 06822 (U), 3 May 1994.
65. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(C)~~Cable 08441 (U), 2 June 1994.
66. (U) DIA, ~~(S)~~MID 132-4A (U), 12 May 1994.
67. (U) Ibid.; and DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 08364, 1 June 1994.

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68. (U) DOS, Secretary of State, ~~(S)~~ Telegram 145524 (U), 1 June 1994; FBIS, Wirefile PA3105231794, 31 May 1994; and FBIS, Wirefile PA0606035994, 6 June 1994.
69. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 08574, 6 June 1994.
70. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(S)~~ Cable 06553 (U), 28 April 1994.
71. (U) Ibid ; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(S)~~ Cable 06588 (U), 28 April 1994; and DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 06684, 29 April 1994.
72. (U) When the head of the Colombian National Police arrived in Washington, DC, for scheduled appointments to the Drug Enforcement Administration offices, he found that his visit had been canceled. No explanations were provided to him at the time, and he returned to Colombia disconcerted by this reception. Once the incident became public knowledge, Colombians were angered by this offensive treatment of one of their public officials.
73. (U) In the wake of the US-Colombian CD controversies, some US senators attempted to place an amendment conditioning Colombian CD funds. The Colombian government reacted negatively to this demand, stating that if the aid was offered in this fashion it would be refused. The amendment was later defeated.
74. (U) See DA, 4th PSYOP Gp (Abn), Ft. Bragg, NC, ~~(S)~~ *Colombian Military Attitudes and Issues Affecting Participation in the Drug War* (U), SPA, 31 March 1994.
75. (U) Interviews with a senior member of US MILGP, Bogota, 24 June 1993 and 2 December 1993.
76. (U) Conversation with a Colombian army major, Bogota, 1 December 1992; and Interview with a senior member of USIA, Bogota, 11 December 1992; and DOS, ~~(S)~~ Cable 02109 (U), 9 February 1993.
77. (U) Interview with a Colombian army major, Bogota, 1 December 1992; Interview with Colombian field grade officers, 18-25 September 1993; and Interview with US embassy country team member, Bogota, 9 December 1992.
78. (U) Interview with US embassy country team member, Bogota, 9 December 1992.
79. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 06684, 29 April 1994.
80. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(S)~~ Cable 06553 (U), 28 April 1994.
81. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 18754, 7 December 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, Cable 19230, 17 December 1993; and DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(S)~~ Cable 06589 (U), 28 April 1994.
82. (U) DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(S)~~ Cable 04462 (U), 23 March 1993; DOS, AMEMB Bogota, ~~(S)~~ Cable 012178 (U), 18 August 1994; and Interview with a senior member of USIA, Bogota, 11 December 1992.
83. (U) Interview with a senior member of USIA, Bogota, 11 December 1992.



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E303	1	497 IG/INOA
<b>(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3507, (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)</b>		
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