

~~Secret~~



(b)(1)
(b)(3)



Directorate of Intelligence

Colombia: Challenging Assumptions—A Methodological Look at the 1994 Presidential Election



Intelligence Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [redacted]
Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
with a contribution from [redacted] Office of
Leadership Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, [redacted]
[redacted] ALA, on [redacted]
[redacted]

Reverse Blank

~~Secret~~

ALA 94-10003
May 1994

~~Secret~~
[redacted]**Colombia: Challenging Assumptions—A Methodological Look at the 1994 Presidential Election** [redacted]**Key Findings**

Information available as of 1 May 1994 was used in this report.

The stakes for the United States in the 29 May 1994 presidential election in Colombia are high. The election of ruling Liberal Party nominee Ernesto Samper would represent a departure from much of President Gaviria's legacy in counternarcotics strategy and aspects of his economic liberalization. Samper has:

- Supported decriminalizing the drug trade—a stance on which he only recently has begun to publicly backtrack.
- Opposed Colombia's vigorous aerial eradication campaign against opium poppies.
- Publicly criticized Gaviria for accelerating the pace of tariff cuts and exposing domestic industries to foreign competitors.
- Argued that Colombian industries need government support to compete against subsidized exports, particularly agricultural goods, from industrialized countries. [redacted]

Ironically, his opponent, Andres Pastrana of the opposition Conservative Party, advocates a continuation of Gaviria's policies, albeit with changes. Pastrana:

- Generally supports Gaviria's counternarcotics policies and has publicly repudiated the concept of drug legalization.
- Favors an expanded role for the private sector in the economy and would probably continue, to the extent possible, Gaviria's privatization efforts. [redacted]

We expect a close race between these candidates. As of mid-April, Samper led Pastrana in the polls by 5 points. [redacted]

This paper takes a fresh, unconventional look at the contest by applying an electoral methodology called the Thirteen Keys to the Presidency, which has been employed successfully to forecast three US elections. It lends depth to our understanding of why the race is so close by assessing the past performance of the party in power—rather than relying on opinion polls or actions by the opposition that are likely to change as the campaign progresses. [redacted]

As applied to Colombia, the methodology indicates that the election on 29 May is a dead heat, and that the runoff several weeks later is likely to be equally close. In fact, four weeks before the election, it appears that Samper and Pastrana will each win six of the 13 keys, leaving the

~~Secret~~ALA 94-10003
May 1994

~~Secret~~

ability of either candidate to bolster his identification with the incumbent administration as the critical key to victory.¹ [redacted]

President Gaviria's tenure in office has brought about major policy changes—economic, political, and judicial reforms—that should be major assets to Samper, but perhaps not enough to ensure his victory. The strength of the incumbent-party candidate greatly depends on the successes and failures of the current administration—whatever the nominee's agreement or disagreement on specific issues with the sitting president—because he inherits the party's mandate and represents its basic philosophy. The incumbent-party nominee should benefit from:

- Gaviria's economic reforms, which encouraged new investment, reduced official unemployment to 7.6 percent, slowly reduced inflation to 22 percent, and maintained steady GDP growth—5.2 percent for 1993.
- The absence of a foreign policy disaster.
- The absence of a military debacle in the war against the Marxist guerrillas—an issue of continuing high public interest.

Samper's deliberate distancing of himself from some of Gaviria's policies, however, may prevent him from fully exploiting the government's achievements to his advantage. The Thirteen Keys methodology suggests that this is the single greatest hurdle to a Samper victory. [redacted]

In contrast, the scandal that followed the escape of drug kingpin Pablo Escobar seriously tarnished the Liberals' reputation for clean government and is a scar that hurts the incumbent party's campaign. High-level corruption was exposed, and a prolonged Senate investigation reinforced the image of ruling-party corruption and ineptitude. [redacted]

Samper's efforts to differentiate himself from the still-popular Gaviria also led to a rift in the party that he has only belatedly tried to heal. In an effort to unite the party behind him, Samper in March selected his chief Liberal rival for the nomination, Humberto de la Calle, as his vice presidential running mate. Samper doubtless hopes that de la Calle's close ties to the President will overcome voter concerns over Samper's differences with Gaviria and reassure party skeptics that proreform forces will have a voice in his administration. [redacted]

Moreover, a larger than usual field of third-party candidates—16 in all—is likely to cut into the support of the Liberal and Conservative frontrunners in the May election. This is especially serious for the incumbent-party candidate in the populous North Coast—ordinarily a

¹When the methodology is applied to US presidential elections, a loss of six or more keys by the incumbent-party candidate predicts that the challenger will be victorious. [redacted]

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Liberal bastion and the single largest regional bloc of votes in Colombia—where a late 1993 poll showed Samper's support to be weak. [REDACTED]

Although the Thirteen Keys methodology assumes that few factors change late in the campaign, we believe the ruling-party candidate might still shift the election calculus in his favor before the first round of balloting. To do so, he would need to focus on winning the political keys by endorsing the achievements of the Gaviria administration. His selection of de la Calle as his running mate was a step in this direction. The ruling-party nominee might also try to convince the major third-party candidates to drop out of the race before the first round of balloting by offering them Cabinet posts in the next administration. Samper has already offered ex-M-19 guerrilla leader and leftist third-party contender Navarro Wolff four Cabinet posts in his administration in exchange for his support. [REDACTED]

Pastrana could strengthen his position by playing upon the incumbent-party candidate's major weakness—his lack of close identification with Gaviria's policies. Independent and undecided Liberal voters are almost certainly attracted to the opposition ticket because they view Pastrana as the heir apparent to Gaviria's reformist legacy. To reinforce this image, the opposition candidate could stress the ruling-party candidate's populist leanings, his flip-flops on such issues as drug legalization and privatization, and the parallels between the socioeconomic platforms of Samper and Navarro, who remains an unpopular figure among moderate voters. [REDACTED]

Reverse Blank

v

~~Secret~~

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Key Findings	iii
Scope Note	ix
Presidential Contenders	1
Why Take a Fresh Look at the Elections?	1
The Stakes for the United States	1
Political System in Flux	3
Critical Factors Influencing the Election Outcome	5
Performance Keys—Leaning Toward the Ruling Party	5
Major Policy Change	5
Growing Economy	5
Absence of Social Unrest	7
Foreign or Military Successes and Failures	7
Scandal—the Escobar Debacle	8
Political Keys—Favoring the Challenger	8
Candidate Identification With Sitting President	8
Nomination Contest	9
Third-Party Challengers	9
Party Mandate in the House	10
The Personality Keys—Splitting the Difference	10
Trends To Watch in the 1994 Election	10
Critical Factors That Could Change Our Analysis	11
Incumbent-Party Candidate	11
Opposition Challenger	12
 Appendixes	
A. Applying the Thirteen Keys Methodology to the Colombian Election	13
B. Public Positions of the Leading Candidates	15


~~Secret~~
Scope Note

We have used an election forecasting methodology from academia known as the Thirteen Keys to the Presidency to offer a thought-provoking alternative to conventional election analysis that cuts through campaign rhetoric and changeable public opinion polls to identify underlying factors that determine the outcomes. We have also isolated factors that could change the analysis—and the likely election results—in the coming month. Because this is the first time that the Directorate of Intelligence has utilized this methodology, we have provided a detailed explanation of the approach and its adaptation to Colombia in appendix A.

~~Secret~~



Figure 1
Colombia: The Leading Presidential Contenders,
Where They Stand in the Polls



Unclassified

344181 DG 5-94

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Colombia: Challenging Assumptions—A Methodological Look at the 1994 Presidential Election

Presidential Contenders

The 29 May 1994 Colombian presidential election is a contest between the nominees of the ruling Liberal Party, which has won the presidency in all but one election since the end of formal power-sharing arrangements with the opposition in 1974, and the rival Conservative Party, which now believes it has its best chance in over a decade to elect the chief executive. With President Gaviria legally unable to run for a second term, the Liberal Party has chosen Ernesto Samper, a former legislator, diplomat, and Economic Development Minister from the party's center-left wing, as its standard bearer. Andres Pastrana, a former television journalist, mayor of Bogota, senator, and leader of a reformist conservative faction called the New Democratic Force is the Conservative Party challenger. The top contenders will confront third-party challengers such as Antonio Navarro Wolff of the leftwing Democratic Alliance/M-19 party, running on the "Commitment Colombia Party" banner. If no candidate receives more than 50 percent of the votes, a runoff between the top two finishers is slated for 19 June. We expect a close race between these candidates. As of mid-April, Samper led Pastrana in the polls by 5 points.

Why Take a Fresh Look at the Elections?

The Stakes for the United States

Despite Samper's nomination by the ruling party, his election would signal a departure from aspects of President Gaviria's legacy in economic liberalization:

- In the trade area, Samper has publicly criticized Gaviria for accelerating the pace of tariff cuts and exposing domestic industries to foreign competitors before completing other aspects of the reform program, such as improving the infrastructure and providing a more efficient customs service.

- He proposes to increase social spending by redirecting funds from the defense and judicial budgets,

- [redacted] if elected, he would slow privatization.


- Further, he argues that Colombian industries should receive more government support to compete against subsidized exports, particularly agricultural goods, from industrialized countries.

Samper's election probably would also signal a significant reduction in support for counternarcotics programs and increased drug cartel influence in the government. Since the early 1980s, Samper has supported decriminalizing the drug trade—a stance on which he only recently has begun to backtrack publicly—and has vowed that Colombia will not become the "Vietnam" of the drug war, an indirect swipe at US-supported counterdrug operations. He also opposes the use of glyphosate, a chemical that has been critical to the success of Colombia's vigorous aerial eradication campaign, to eradicate opium poppies.

Samper suffered public embarrassment last September when three of his campaign supporters, a senator and two congressmen, publicly accepted the backing of Evaristo Porras, a major trafficker in the Amazonas Department and a local boss of the Liberal Party.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~



[Redacted]
[Redacted] (See appendix B for a detailed explanation of the public positions of the candidates on the campaign trail.) [Redacted]

In contrast, Pastrana advocates a continuation of Gaviria's policies, albeit with changes. As a television journalist in 1988, he focused public attention on the power of the drug cartels and was later kidnapped by Pablo Escobar's henchmen during his

~~Secret~~

[redacted]

[redacted] In February he publicly repudiated the concept of drug legalization in Colombia. Pastrana has expressed some reservations about the pace of the economic liberalization, but he is a strong backer of Colombia's economic opening, the *apertura*. He favors an expanded role for the private sector in the economy and would probably continue, to the extent possible, Gaviria's privatization efforts. Pastrana is an admirer of the US political and economic system and has close ties to the Colombian business community [redacted]

Political System in Flux

Although opinion polls indicate a close race, many political and academic observers assume that over the last decade the incumbent Liberal Party has developed a virtual lock on the presidency. Since 1935 the Liberals have captured the presidency in 11 out of 17 elections. They have also maintained their dominance in the House of Representatives during this period, losing control only three times. Immediately following Gaviria's election in 1990, opinion polls indicated that 46 percent of the public identified itself with the Liberal Party, while only 17 percent identified with the Conservatives. Although factionalism has long plagued both parties, in recent years disunity has fragmented the Conservative Party far more than the Liberals, reinforcing the view of many political observers that the Conservatives could win the presidency only if the Liberal Party were severely divided.

[redacted]

The 1994 campaign is casting doubt on the assumption that the Liberals have such a lock on the presidency. The tables turned early in the campaign as the Liberals developed deep fissures over Samper's candidacy. More important, a late 1993 nationwide survey indicated that traditional party affiliations were breaking down and voter loyalties were up for grabs, a development that Pastrana has tried to exploit by painting his campaign as a national movement transcending party labels. The poll showed that:

- Less than 23 percent of the respondents viewed themselves as members of a particular political

campaign for mayor of Bogota. Since then, he has publicly shied away from criticizing the cartels and has said little about the narcotics issue during the campaign [redacted]

[redacted]


~~Secret~~

Figure 2
Colombia: Samper and Pastrana on Economic Reform



*In this very city and at this very hour,
 just a few blocks from here, others
 are meeting to position themselves in
 support of savage capitalism.*

Ernesto Samper



*In this very city and at this very hour,
 the members of Jurassic Park are
 meeting, those representatives of the
 old politics, . . . to renew their votes
 in favor of protectionism and under-
 development.*

Andres Pastrana

12 February 1994
El Tiempo (Bogota, Colombia)

Unclassified

344182 5-84pm5

party, a marked drop since the 1960s and 1970s, when nearly every Colombian identified with either the Liberal or Conservative Party.

- The trend toward political independence was most pronounced in the largest urban areas, an

important factor given that 70 to 80 percent of the populace now resides in metropolitan areas.

~~Secret~~

Rising voter abstention rates are another indication of the declining importance of political parties. Although a record 18 million Colombians have registered to vote this year, [redacted] the abstention rate in the congressional election and Liberal presidential primary in March was 70 percent, a historical high. Abstention rates were also high in 1990, [redacted] much to voter apathy and alienation from the major parties as to narco and guerrilla violence.² Moreover, the growing inability of the parties to use their regional machines to mobilize voters indicates that, in presidential elections at least, the positions and public image of the candidate are more important than the ability of the party to turn out the vote. It also suggests that candidates can no longer rely on local party bosses to deliver the vote. [redacted]

Critical Factors Influencing the Election Outcome

This paper uses an electoral methodology known as the Thirteen Keys to the Presidency.³ Its basic assumption is that the election in May is more likely to be a referendum on the achievements and failures of the incumbent Gaviria administration than a contest over new policy directions or issues raised by the candidates in the heat of the campaign. Our application of the Thirteen Keys indicates that neither leading candidate is likely to win an outright victory on 29 May, and the runoff several weeks later is likely to be close. Although the ruling-party candidate is well positioned as a result of the strong performance of the Gaviria administration, his deliberate distancing from some of the President's policies has prevented him from fully exploiting the government's achievements to his advantage. The challenge posed by several

² The 1990 election contained no provision for a second round of balloting, and the victor was the candidate with a plurality of votes. To avoid the possibility of electing a president who might be hobbled by this situation, the 1991 Constitution provides for a runoff election. [redacted]

³ The Thirteen Keys to the Presidency methodology used here was developed through a study of US presidential election history, but is applicable to other democracies with similar political systems, according to its author, Dr. Allan Lichtman of American University. See appendix A for a fuller discussion of the methodology. [redacted]

third-party candidates is also a significant liability for both candidates. Contrary to the views of some political observers, our analysis using the Thirteen Keys methodology suggests that the personalities of the Liberal and Conservative candidates will have little bearing on the final outcome. [redacted]

Performance Keys—Leaning Toward the Ruling Party


The performance of the incumbent administration in legislating fundamental change to national policy, managing the economy, avoiding persistent social and labor unrest, and implementing effective foreign and military policies measure conditions that directly affect the lives of voters and their perceptions of the ruling party. The strength of the incumbent-party candidate greatly depends on the successes and failures of the current administration—whatever the nominee's agreement or disagreement on specific issues with the sitting president—because he inherits the party's mandate and represents its basic philosophy. [redacted]

Major Policy Change. On balance, Gaviria's tenure in office has brought about major policy changes that award this key to the Liberal candidate, according to our methodology. Capitalizing on longstanding popular support for change, Gaviria worked with the Constituent Assembly in 1991 to draft a Constitution that has established a legacy of political modernization and economic reform to make the country more stable and competitive in the 21st century. To modernize the legal system, Gaviria pushed for a US-style system of justice with special courts and a new criminal code to handle terrorist and narcotics cases. He supported the Assembly's effort to redress the executive-legislative balance of power, which historically has favored a strong presidency. To strengthen the economy, Gaviria pressed for several reform measures, including the start of privatization of state enterprises, a broad-based lowering of tariff barriers, and tax reform. [redacted]

Growing Economy. The health of the economy under the current and former Liberal administrations should also help Samper. Real per capita

~~Secret~~

**Colombia: The Thirteen Keys
to the Presidency Explained**



The Thirteen Keys election methodology relies on an assessment of the past performance of the party in power to determine its prospects of reelection rather than on opinion polls or actions by the opposition that are likely to change dramatically as the campaign progresses. The methodology examines 13 underlying factors or "keys" to judge the performance of the incumbent party. The diagnostic system includes:

- Seven keys that examine the overall performance of the incumbent administration.
- Four keys that assess the political prospects of the ruling-party candidate.
- Two keys that determine whether personal style will play a factor in the election.

Ten of the keys are analytical in nature, and three are determined mathematically. Judgments are reached on whether individual keys favor the ruling-party candidate. A loss of six to eight keys would suggest a close race.

The Keys

Performance

1. Major Policy Change

The ruling party wins the key if the administration effects major changes in national policy.

2. Long-Term Economy

The ruling party wins this key if real per capita growth during the sitting president's term equals or exceeds mean growth during the terms of the previous two presidents.

3. Short-Term Economy

The ruling party wins this key if the economy is not in recession during the election campaign.

4. Social Unrest

The ruling party wins this key if there is no sustained social unrest (labor strife/popular protest) during the current term.

5. Foreign/Military Failure

The ruling party wins the key if the administration suffers no major failure in foreign or military affairs.

6. Foreign/Military Success

The ruling party wins the key only if the administration achieves a significant victory in foreign or military affairs.

7. Scandal

The ruling party wins the key if the incumbent administration is untainted by major scandal.

Political

8. Candidate Identification With Sitting President

In those situations in which the ruling-party candidate is not the sitting president, the ruling party wins the key if its candidate is identified with the sitting president and his platform represents continuity with the current president.

9. Nomination Contest

The ruling party wins the contest key if there is no serious contest for the party's presidential nomination.

10. Third-Party Challenge

The ruling party wins this key if there is no significant third-party or independent campaign.

11. Party Mandate

The ruling party wins the mandate key if it achieves a net gain in the House of Representatives in the previous two House elections.

Personality

12. Incumbent Candidate Charisma


The ruling party wins this key if its candidate is charismatic or a national hero.

13. Opposition Candidate Charisma

The ruling party wins the key if the challenging-party candidate is not charismatic or a national hero.



**Colombia:
Scoring the
Campaign**



Denotes winner of key

Indicator	Incumbent-party candidate	Opposition challenger
	Samper	Pastrana
1. Major policy change	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
2. Long-term economy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
3. Short-term economy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
4. Social unrest	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
5. Foreign/military failure	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
6. Foreign/military success		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7. Scandal		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>



344178pm 5-94

income has grown by 1.6 percent annually during the current administration (1990-93), exceeding the 1.5-percent annual growth achieved during the previous two presidencies (1982-89). This formulation indicates that the long-term economy key favors the ruling-party candidate.

To win the short-term economy key, neither any indication that a recession is looming during the campaign nor any popular perception of an economic downturn should be present. Gaviria's reforms encouraged new investment, maintained steady GDP growth—5.2 percent for 1993—reduced official unemployment to 7.6 percent, and slowly reduced inflation to 22 percent.

The current health of the economy guarantees that this key also belongs to the incumbent candidate.

Absence of Social Unrest. The lack of sustained unrest over the last three and a half years resulting in major violence or rioting against the Gaviria administration's policies is a plus for the incumbent-party candidate. The failure of the national labor confederation's call for a general strike in 1990 led to passage by Congress of a

number of labor reforms that curtailed union power. Periodic labor strife did occur, however, in the 1992-93 period:

- Strikes in the state-owned petroleum company.
- Unrest following the privatization of Colombia's ports.
- A short-lived, violent strike over the proposed privatization of the state-owned telecommunications company.
- Sporadic violence marking a struggle between rival insurgent groups for control of unions in the banana-growing region.

None of these incidents caused serious and long-lasting national economic disruption or riots.

Consequently, the Liberals win the social unrest key as well.

Foreign or Military Successes and Failures.

Major achievements, such as a decisive victory in war or a historic treaty, as well as significant debacles, like a costly military defeat or a humiliating foreign policy disaster that diminished its stature in

~~Secret~~

the world, can greatly affect the public's perception of the incumbent administration. Two keys are used to assess the administration's performance in this area because it is possible to have both a major success and a major failure in foreign or military affairs during a president's entire term. The absence of a foreign policy disaster is a plus for the ruling-party candidate, and the Gaviria administration has clearly avoided large diplomatic missteps. Although the government has chalked up a series of foreign accomplishments as well—the signing of the G-3 trade accord with Venezuela and Mexico, closer economic integration with Venezuela, Gaviria's election as OAS Secretary General, and pursuit of membership in other regional economic organizations—none of them is popularly seen as a historic event. The ruling-party candidate therefore does not benefit from the foreign policy success key. [redacted]

Similarly, the lack of a military disaster in the war against the Marxist guerrillas—an issue of continuing high public interest—directly benefits the incumbent-party candidate, using the criteria of the Thirteen Keys. Military persistence in combating the decades-old rural-based insurgency has contained any serious rebel threat to state control and is the chief factor awarding this key to the ruling party. [redacted]

Nonetheless, the incumbent party loses the military success key because the Gaviria administration has not made major progress in negotiating an end to the conflict nor has the military dealt the insurgents a mortal blow. Peace talks between the government and the insurgents broke down in mid-1991. The guerrillas have subsequently launched several offensives in the hope of pressing the administration to return to the negotiating table on their terms. [redacted]

Scandal—the Escobar Debacle. The scandal that followed the escape of drug kingpin Pablo Escobar damaged Gaviria's popularity and seriously tarnished the Liberals' reputation for clean government, handing this key to the opposition challenger. The Escobar escape exposed lax security, high-level military corruption, and even official graft stemming from the construction of

Envigado prison, where the drug lord was "jailed" under luxurious conditions. Several senior civilian and military officers were dismissed, and a prolonged Senate investigation reinforced the image of Liberal Party corruption and ineptitude. [redacted]

Although the death of Escobar in December 1993 at the hands of security forces has permitted the populace to "turn the page" on narcoterrorism, we doubt whether it diminished the public's view of the size of the blot on the administration's record. For example, the incident has helped to bring the corruption issue to life in the campaigns of Pastrana, two of the three third-party candidates, and some Liberal dissidents. [redacted]

Political Keys—Favoring the Challenger

These keys analyze the strength and cohesion of the party in power during the last four years, internal party ideological strife and unity, and the importance of any third-party campaigns that may be spawned by discord in the ruling party. [redacted]


Candidate Identification With Sitting President.

Samper's decision initially to criticize the record of the Gaviria administration has placed him squarely at odds with the President on some issues and has created a public image of opportunism that has hurt his campaign. His call for an era of policy consolidation is a not-so-veiled challenge to Gaviria's era of major policy change. Samper has attacked the pace of economic liberalization and encouraged protectionist measures for some industries, and his public statements and private views on Gaviria's counternarcotics policy suggest he favors an accommodationist policy toward the cartel and eventual decriminalization of the drug trade. His views are denying him the ability to build on Gaviria's popular record of achievement—a recent poll shows strong public support for economic reform—and are ceding valuable issues to Pastrana, who is more closely aligned with Gaviria's reformist policies. [redacted]

[redacted] Gaviria, before Samper's nomination, barely concealed his distaste

~~Secret~~

**Colombia:
Scoring the
Campaign**



Denotes winner of key

Indicator	Incumbent-party candidate Samper	Opposition challenger Pastrana
8. Candidate identification with sitting president	?	?
9. Nomination contest		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
10. Third-party challenge		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
11. Party mandate		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

344179pm 5-94

for Samper. The President's disputes with the Liberal candidate over social security reform and the participation of Pastrana's party in the Cabinet have spilled into the media. [redacted]

Pastrana's well-known support for Gaviria. Consequently, we are unable to award this key to either candidate given the ambiguity created by Samper's most recent moves. [redacted]

Despite these factors, we find it difficult to award this key to the opposition challenger because Samper's most recent efforts to shore up a once-sagging campaign have appreciably increased his identification with the Gaviria administration's policies. The Liberal candidate, recognizing the political damage caused by his thinly veiled criticism of the President, selected his chief rival for the Liberal nomination, Humberto de la Calle, a staunch backer of Gaviria's economic and social policies, as his running mate. The choice has helped to unite a party at odds over Samper's candidacy, to reassure party skeptics that proreform forces will have a voice in a Samper administration, and to blur the policy differences between the presidential candidate and the President. [redacted]

Nomination Contest. Although Samper won the Liberal Party nomination, his seven rivals deliberately withheld support—despite appeals to drop out of the primary—to negotiate for influence with his campaign after the March primary election. For the nomination to be rated as uncontested, Samper would have had to win by a two-thirds majority; he won with 44 percent, thus losing this key. [redacted]


[redacted] Samper's campaign handlers have also tried to repackage his image, tempering his populist rhetoric with favorable references to Gaviria's legacy, although his speeches still fall short of a wholehearted endorsement of the President's policies and do not cancel out

Third-Party Challengers. A larger than usual field of third-party candidates—16 in all—is likely to cut into Samper's support in the May election, especially in the populous North Coast—ordinarily a Liberal bastion and the largest single regional bloc of votes in Colombia. The Thirteen Keys methodology specifies that if one or more third-party challengers is expected to receive at least 5 percent of the vote, the incumbent candidate loses this key. The smaller party nominees include:

- Antonio Navarro Wolff of the leftist Democratic Alliance/M-19. Navarro polled 13 percent of the

~~Secret~~

**Colombia:
Scoring the
Campaign**



Indicator	Incumbent- party candidate	Opposition challenger
	Samper	Pastrana
12. Incumbent candidate charisma		■
13. Opposition candidate charisma	☐	

☐ Denotes winner of key

344180pm 5-94

vote in 1990, and hopes to play kingmaker in the second round of presidential balloting. His drawing power, however, may have been hurt by the poor showing of his party in the March legislative elections.

- Miguel Maza, a former National Police general who led the fight against the Medellin cartel under the Barco administration. Maza has placed fourth in some polls.
- Enrique Parejo, a Liberal maverick and former Justice Minister. Parejo bolted the ruling party to signal his dissatisfaction with Samper's candidacy and is campaigning under antinarco, anticorruption banners. Parejo is unlikely to siphon off large numbers of Samper supporters, however.

Party Mandate in the House. The size of the Liberal majority in the House of Representatives can signal waning or continued voter support for the incumbent party, particularly given that only two months separate the congressional elections from the presidential race. The Thirteen Keys' formulation of party mandate—a calculation of net loss or gain in House seats in the previous midterm and presidential year elections—indicates that the ruling-party candidate loses this key. The Liberals, although they remain the largest bloc in the House, have suffered a net loss of 30 seats in the last two

House elections—including the March 1994 race—suggesting slowly declining voter preference for the ruling party.

The Personality Keys—Splitting the Difference

Although the personalities of presidential contenders can be decisive factors in an election outcome, they do not appear to be key factors in the Colombian race. For Samper or Pastrana to win their respective charisma keys, either would have to be a highly magnetic personality or a leader of heroic proportions. Samper is often a dull campaigner; in speeches he often dwells on policy details and has been upstaged by his vice-presidential candidate, who is capable of rousing his audience.

helps cost him the charisma key. Similarly, Pastrana is not known as an inspiring or electrifying campaigner and loses his charisma key. In contrast to Samper, however, he is usually polished—albeit scripted—during public appearances from his years as a television journalist.

Trends To Watch in the 1994 Election

Our analysis of the 13 key factors suggests that the race on 29 May will be close. In the Colombian electoral context, this means that there probably




~~Secret~~




Colombia's 1994 Election Timetable

<i>13 March</i>	<i>Congressional elections, Liberal Party primary</i>
<i>29 May</i>	<i>Election of president and vice president</i>
<i>19 June</i>	<i>Presidential runoff, if necessary</i>
<i>7 August</i>	<i>Presidential inauguration</i>
<i>30 October</i>	<i>Elections of governors, mayors, city and town councils, and departmental assemblies</i>




will be no first-round winner. 
 In our view, the ruling-party candidate's need to strengthen his identification with the popular sitting President and his policies and the threat posed by the third-party challengers are the primary factors driving this outcome. 


Insights gained from the application of the Thirteen Keys suggest that the second round of balloting will also be close, but with Samper gaining an edge. We base this view on the assumptions—which we believe are valid—that the second round will also serve as a referendum on the incumbent party and that the same underlying factors will be at work in the runoff election. The absence of the third-party challengers in the second round, however, could shift the Thirteen Keys to favor the incumbent-party candidate. 


Critical Factors That Could Change Our Analysis

The Thirteen Keys methodology assumes that few factors are susceptible to change late in the campaign. The personality keys are decided by a candidate's past history and cannot be changed, most of the performance keys are determined months in advance by the incumbent administration, and most of the political keys are set early in the campaign



and usually reflect developments outside the control of the ruling-party candidate. Nonetheless, both candidates have some remaining ability to change the outcome by focusing particularly on the key dealing with close identification with the sitting president. 

Incumbent-Party Candidate

To decrease his political liabilities, Samper would need to trumpet the achievements of Gaviria's administration—because these historic policy changes are a pillar of victory in our methodology—and then stress how he would build on them. He would also need to obtain Gaviria's public endorsement, which the President has so far not provided. These moves would turn the "close identification with the sitting president key" in his favor, and could provide the crucial edge in a hard-fought two-round election. 

If Samper can convince Navarro to drop out of the race before the first round of balloting, he would be able to turn the third-party challenge key in his favor as well. By offering Navarro a deal before the election, Samper would eliminate his only populist, social democratic rival and substantially deflate any antiestablishment protest vote by offering Navarro one or more appointments in the next administration. 



 Even so, a Navarro endorsement would be a stigma for many Liberal stalwarts, who still chafe at the former guerrilla leader's past. 

Among the performance keys, the capture of one or more of the leaders of the two major guerrilla forces would give Samper an electoral advantage. Such an event would almost certainly be seen as a clear-cut military success for the administration, similar to the boost the Fujimori regime in Peru received from the capture of the leader of the Sendero Luminoso. Most political and military

~~Secret~~**Colombia: Political Violence—The Election Wild Card**

Presidential candidates in Colombia run serious risks. In the 1990 campaign, three presidential candidates, including Liberal Party frontrunner Luis Galan, were assassinated. These assassinations are believed to have been the work of Medellin drug lord Pablo Escobar, recently killed by government forces. Then candidate Cesar Gaviria, like his opponents, traveled under heavy security, made few—and brief—campaign appearances, and relied increasingly on television to communicate with voters. [redacted]

The Marxist insurgents, who have adopted a long-term strategy of incrementally extending their military and political control over rural Colombia, pose less of a threat to the presidential candidates. Although the guerrillas have kidnapped and murdered a number of local candidates in this year's election campaign, there is no evidence to suggest that they have any intention of targeting one of the presidential candidates. [redacted]

The Cali cartel has been less prone toward the use of terrorism to achieve its aims; however, we believe the Cali drug lords would use selective political violence. [redacted]

[redacted] might cause the cartel to redouble its efforts to get the Liberal Party nominee, Ernesto Samper, elected to the presidency. To sabotage the Conservatives, Cali will probably continue to try to suborn one of Pastrana's advisers or the candidate himself; [redacted]

[redacted] the cartel may strike out violently against Pastrana. His assassination would almost certainly ensure Samper's election, intimidate the government, and renew popular fears of the return to the days of narco-terrorism that most Colombians believed died with Pablo Escobar. [redacted]

observers believe, however, that it is highly unlikely that the government would be able to score such a victory as long as the guerrilla leaders remain protected in their rural strongholds. The security forces have captured several rebel front commanders and financial leaders in the past year, but only when they have strayed into the cities for medical treatment or for contact with political front groups. [redacted]

Opposition Challenger

The Conservative challenger could strengthen his position by playing upon the incumbent-party candidate's weak identification with President Gaviria's policies. Independent and undecided Liberal voters are almost certainly attracted to the opposition ticket because they view Pastrana as the heir-apparent to Gaviria's reformist legacy. To reinforce this image with the voters, the opposition candidate could accentuate his policy differences with Samper, stressing the ruling-party candidate's populist leanings and his flip-flops on such issues as drug legalization and privatization. Moreover, Pastrana could draw parallels between the socioeconomic platforms of Samper and leftist third-party candidate Navarro Wolff, and warn that the ex-guerrilla may receive important Cabinet positions under a Samper administration. [redacted]

~~Secret~~

Appendix A

Applying the Thirteen Keys Methodology to the Colombian Election

The Thirteen Keys is a diagnostic system that embodies a broad-based "performance" theory of presidential elections. A major premise of this model is that the presidential election is a referendum on the record of the incumbent party. The methodology identifies 13 variables or "keys" that gauge the political strength and performance of the party in power to measure its reelection prospects long before opinion polls have anything meaningful to say and the campaign issues are fully defined. The first seven variables—the performance keys—judge the incumbent administration's successes and failures, the next four—the political keys—assess the strength and unity of the ruling party, and the last two—the personality keys—assess whether a candidate's personal traits and degree of charisma will affect the result. Keys are won or lost by the incumbent-party candidate on the basis of analytical judgments reached on whether the party in power has satisfied the condition specified in the key. Only three keys are determined by simple mathematical calculation—the two economy keys and the party mandate key. If the ruling party is able to turn eight keys in its favor, its victory is probable; conversely, a loss of six or more keys suggests its defeat, when applied to US elections. [redacted]

The Thirteen Keys methodology was developed by Dr. Allan Lichtman, Professor of History at American University in Washington, D.C. He used pattern recognition techniques against his research into the historical determinants of US presidential elections since 1857 to distill the 13 most influential determinants of electoral success. The Thirteen Keys methodology has since been used to accurately forecast the outcomes of the last three US presidential elections. In 1984 the methodology forecast President Reagan's reelection two years in advance; in 1988 it foretold President Bush's election at a time in the campaign when he was 14 points down in the polls; in 1992 the keys predicted President Clinton's election months ahead in what was a close race. [redacted]

We believe this methodology can be applied to Colombia to underscore major underlying election trends because of its general similarities with US election politics. Like the United States, Colombia has a strong, two-party system that recently has seen the addition of small, third-party challenges. It has a bicameral legislature and a federal system and holds presidential elections every four years. Unlike the United States, however, its president cannot stand for reelection, and its Constitution contains a new provision for a runoff in the event no candidate receives more than 50 percent in the first round of balloting. We have modified one key in the methodology to reflect Colombian differences:

- In consultation with Dr. Lichtman, we substituted a key that asks whether the ruling-party candidate is closely identified with the sitting president's policies, for the original key that simply mirrored whether the ruling-party candidate is or is not the sitting president.
- This substitution accounts for the fact that Colombian presidents cannot succeed themselves while preserving the essential point of the original key, that incumbency is a political advantage and ruling-party candidates usually represent policy continuity. [redacted]

The methodology as applied to Colombia is useful in stimulating new ways to think about political dynamics. It should not be used as an election-forecasting tool, as it is in the United States, because we have not applied pattern recognition techniques to a series of Colombian elections to validate its applicability in a foreign setting. Rather, our intent is to discuss the critical electoral factors that can provide the reader with a strategic roadmap to interpret the campaign despite the tactical twists and turns of opinion polls, editorial comment, and campaign events. [redacted]

Appendix B

Public Positions of the Leading Candidates

Economic Reform

Andres Pastrana:

- Backs *apertura* reforms and plans to make the economy more efficient, productive, and competitive.
- Favors accession to a hemispheric free trade agreement (FTA), but insists Colombia needs time to enter the market with solid and competitive industries.

Ernesto Samper:

- *Apertura* will continue, but with a "human face"; the agricultural sector in particular will receive protection from imports, and privatization will continue, although public monopolies will not be turned into private monopolies.
- Plans to internationalize the economy and foresees a hemispheric FTA; intends to negotiate opening foreign markets to Colombian goods.

Antonio Navarro:

- *Apertura* was necessary to open the economy but was implemented too quickly.
- Cautious about a hemispheric FTA, citing different levels of development among current and potential signatories.

Government Reform

Andres Pastrana:

- Has called for a humane, honest, and efficient state; says he shares President Gaviria's vision for the country and pledges to consolidate the government reform process, including strengthening the judiciary and the office of the *Procurador General*, a government watchdog agency.

Ernesto Samper:

- Intends to present an anticorruption bill to Congress and has launched an ethics code applicable to his campaign and presidency that would require all officials to submit copies of their tax returns and bar employment for those with criminal records or who have been fired for disciplinary reasons.

Antonio Navarro:

- Salutes the work of the office of the *Fiscal General* (chief prosecutor), but says the prosecutor's powers have led to violations of the defendants' rights.
- Urges the public to revoke his presidential mandate as specified in article 40 of the Constitution if he does not keep his campaign promises in office.

Counternarcotics

Andres Pastrana:

- Opposes decriminalization of production, trafficking, and consumption of drugs; intends to improve antidrug strategies.
- Willing to bring in foreign advisers to coordinate the campaign against narcoterrorism.

Ernesto Samper:

- Although previously advocated drug legalization, says the proposal is not now viable because it might be interpreted as granting amnesty to drug traffickers.
- Supports President Gaviria's policy of encouraging drug-trafficker surrenders and using plea bargaining to obtain convictions.

~~Secret~~**Antonio Navarro:**

- Favors legalizing drugs.

Social Issues**Andres Pastrana:**

- Promises access to basic education for all citizens and expanded potable water and sewage service.

Ernesto Samper:

- Pledges more investment in basic services such as health, education, and housing.

Antonio Navarro:

- Vows to resolve "inequality" in Colombian society—what he considers to be the gravest social injustice—and proposes health and education subsidies.

Domestic Security**Andres Pastrana:**

- Favors reconciliation with guerrillas, but would negotiate only if insurgents are sincere in wanting to demobilize; would strengthen the armed forces and the judicial system.

Ernesto Samper:

- Vows to wage an all-out fight against the guerrillas, but would consider peace talks; would strengthen the armed forces and intelligence services.

Antonio Navarro:

- Pledges to sign accords with guerrilla groups and reintegrate them into society before 2000.

International Affairs**Andres Pastrana:**

- Supports deployments of foreign troops to Colombia on humanitarian missions, such as the US engineer battalion's "Strong Roads" project in early 1994.

- Cites excellent political contacts in Europe and the hemisphere that will allow him to expand commercial ties.

- Opposes trade with Cuba until that government condemns continued fighting by Colombian guerrillas.

Ernesto Samper:

- Opposed deployment of US troops to Colombia in early 1994 on a humanitarian mission, vowing to never permit US troops on Colombian soil if elected president.

Antonio Navarro:

- Proposes greater integration with Venezuela, Central America, and the Caribbean.
- Strongly opposed the humanitarian deployment of US troops to Colombia in early 1994, calling it "an unjustified violation" of sovereignty.

This appendix is Unclassified.

~~Secret~~